

Insights by ALI Fellow Lumkile Mondi on the Eskom crisis

On 14 December 2018, President Ramaphosa appointed an eight-member team to assist Eskom in identifying “operational, structural and financial challenges,” and it was expected to submit recommendations on how to solve Eskom’s woes by the end of January 2019. The task team consisted of Anton Eberhard, former Eskom CEO Brian Dames, Tsakani Mthombeni, Sy Gourrah, Grové Steyn, Frans Baleni (a former Eskom board member, Sir Mick Davis (former CEO of Xstrata and a former executive director of Eskom, having started working there in the latter half of the 1980s and continued into the early 1990s) and Busisiwe Vilakazi.

President Ramaphosa believes that Eskom is too big to fail and, during his State of the Nation Address on 7 February 2019, South Africans expected a far-reaching announcement on the restructuring of Eskom. Based on the recommendations of the task team, he told South Africans that Eskom was only to be restructured into three entities – generation, transmission and distribution – under a holding company, Eskom Holdings Limited (Ramaphosa, 2019). President Cyril Ramaphosa believes that the lesson for South Africa is clear. For growth, South Africa needs a reliable and sustainable supply of electricity. During the State of the Nation Address on 20 June 2019, President Ramaphosa reiterated Eskom’s serious financial, operational and structural problems, that Eskom had sufficient cash to meet its obligations until the end of October 2019. Furthermore, any default by Eskom on its loans could cause a cross-default on its remaining debt impacting on the already constrained fiscus. South Africa’s debt to GDP ratio is estimated at 60 percent, meaning that for every Rand sixty cents goes toward servicing the debt and repayment of capital . In response to the Eskom financial crisis, President Ramaphosa announced the tabling of a Special Appropriation Bill on an urgent basis to allocate a significant portion of the R230 billion fiscal support over the next 10 years that Eskom was presented by the minister of finance, Tito Mboweni on 23 July 2019.

Just like Dannie Steyn in 1989 who had agreed with Eskom engineers that Eskom should remain as it is, the sudden change of heart in 2003 that should focus on its key market, South Africa and the DME not implementing the 1998 White Paper on energy, Eskom again had become too important because it was too vital to the economy to be allowed to fail argued President Ramaphosa (2019). Adding that Eskom was our collective responsibility as a nation and everyone should ensure that it is supported. President Ramaphosa conceded in line with the recommendations of both the Eskom Sustainability Task Team and the Technical Review

Team, that Eskom should deploy its most skilled and experienced personnel to where they are needed most.

President Ramaphosa showed his hand when Freeman Nomvalo was appointed as the Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO). Nomvalo had worked for many years for the National Treasury, as the State General Accountant and later the chief executive of the State Information and Technology Agency (SITA) before going private and later joined the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) as the chief executive. This signalled that the President may not necessarily have his way in deciding the future of Eskom because beyond finance Eskom has operational challenges. Whoever gets appointed as the chief executive of Eskom will provide an indication of how much power and influence President Ramaphosa has in the restructuring of Eskom. This is reminiscent of the indecisions by various boards of Eskom and the politicians following the De Villiers Commission's¹ recommendations on Eskom, which were released in 1984. Eskom has since been undergoing endless restructurings. For now I can safely say that it is going to be a long walk to the restructuring Eskom and a just transition to a low carbon economy which is discussed below.

Towards a just energy transition

The New Growth Path (DED, 2011) and the NDP (National Planning Commission, 2011) commit South Africa to sustainable economic growth, setting a course for climate resilience and low-carbon development. Treasury (2019) recommends a least cost option for electricity capacity deployment and the creation of an independent transmission company to be created from the unbundling of Eskom buying electricity transparently from independent power producers. Moreover, Treasury (2019) calls the introduction of regulation that enables households and firms to sell electricity that they generate. There are also various policies that support low-carbon growth such as the 2011 National Climate Change Response Policy (DEA, 2011). outlines the government's plan for adaptation and mitigation, and the draft National Adaptation Plan provides a strategy to develop interventions to increase resilience across key economic sectors. (DEA, 2015) to reduce the economy's greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. The government's low-carbon initiatives include flagship programmes for energy efficiency

¹ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in the Republic of South Africa, Government Printer. Pretoria (R.P. 19/1985). The De Villiers Commission.


and renewable energy, and carbon capture and storage. The carbon tax on fuel, which was introduced on 1 April 2019, seeks to motivate households and businesses to improve fuel use and operational efficiency, promote the use of low-carbon fuels, and drive green growth and economic diversification (DEA, 2015).

The slow and fractious transition of South Africa's power sector provides is an example of a need to build development coalitions, policy certainty and economic change. The Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) has delivered more than 6,400 megawatts of the 2020 target (7,000 megawatts), spurring more than R200 billion in private-sector investment, including close to R50 billion in foreign investment.

In 2017, however, Eskom, South Africa's state-owned power company and sole buyer of power, stopped signing new power purchase agreements with independent producers as discussed in chapter 5, which caused investor uncertainty about the future of clean energy development, and the government's commitment to encouraging private-sector participation in the energy sector (World Bank, 2018). This action was taken by government despite the growing evidence that variable renewable energy (VRE) prices were getting cheaper and becoming the least cost option for electricity capacity deployment.


Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show the impact of policy decisions in the form of a comparison between the costs per kWh of the variable renewable energy (VRE) independent power producers and Eskom's coal-fired plants. Although the VRE plants are price competitive, price is not the only factor in policy decisions, particularly in societies that have a history of exclusion of key sectors of society where infrastructure provision politicised such as South Africa. Moreover, VRE does not meet all the requirements yet to ensure that the transmission system is stable and a team from Meridian Economics is modelling infrastructure technology investment requirement to mitigate any transmission volatility due to variability that could arise should South Africa choose the least cost option.

Figure 6.11. Rand per kilowatt-hour



Source: The Budget Review 2019

Figure 6.12: Rand per kilowatt-hour



Source: The Budget Review 2019

At the time of writing the thesis, the Department of Minerals and Energy South was in the process of publishing the IRP 2019. At the same time the DME was finalising outstanding contracts relating to procurement from IPP including two coal power plants Khanyisa and Thabametsi. The most recent approved and gazetted version of the IRP is the IRP 2010-2030. An update to the IRP 2010-2030 was published in 2013 but was never approved or gazetted. The input assumptions and base case of a further updated revision of the IRP (the draft IRP 2016) was published by the Department of Energy for comment in October 2016. This revision included updated input assumptions, including demand forecasts, existing plant performance, supply technology costs, decommissioning schedules and capacity that was newly commissioned/under construction as well as preferred bidder power generation capacity. The time horizon for the Draft IRP 2016 was 2050. Some preliminary results were also shared in the form of a proposed base case and two other selected scenarios (CSIR, 2018).

In 2018, following the draft IRP 2018 update process, building on the draft IRP 2016 and comments received, the Department of Energy requested inputs from the public. Similar to the previous submission made by the CSIR, its submission is a contribution to a better understanding and improvement on the current draft IRP 2018.

The installed capacity and energy mix of the recommended plan from the Draft IRP 2018 is shown in Figure 6.18. Coal has maximum electricity deployment capacity of 1 GW to be deployed by 2023; photovoltaic (PV), 0.7 GW by 2025; Wind, 0.2 GW by 2025; and OCCG, 2.3 GW by 2026. The recommended plan stops at 2030 and does not extend beyond to the time horizon of the other scenarios considered (2050). The primary reason for this, as cited by the Department of Energy, is increased levels of uncertainty beyond 2030 in a number of dimensions, including adjustments for the inclusion of new-build coal and imported hydro pre-2030. The recommended plan maintains new-build constraints on solar PV and wind while including policy adjustments for the inclusion of new-build coal and imported hydro pre-2030. A new category is also included - embedded generation –which is most likely to be dominated by solar PV, with an allowance for 200 MW per year until 2030 (CSIR, 2018).

Figure 6.13 below shows the procurement programme bid window summary and emphasises government commitment to the plans and programmes that have been agreed to encourage the shift towards a low-carbon economy. In developing an understanding of how a least cost option could be the dominant factor in a just transition I have used the IRP 2018, which is based on the IRP 2010 introduced in chapter 5 and lean heavily on the work produced by the CSIR (CSIR, 2018).

Figure 6.13: Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme bid window summary

Bid window	Total number of projects	Total MW allocation	Number of projects in commercial operation	of Total MW grid-connected
1	28	1425	28	1415

			1040	19	1033
2	19				
			1452	16	1428
3	17				
3.5		2	200	–	–
4			2205	–	–
	26				
Small (1S2)	10		49	–	–
Small (2S2)	10		50	–	–
Total			6422	63	3876


112

Source: Independent Power Producer Office

Figure 6.14: IRP 2010 planned electricity mix until 2030

Reminder: IRP 2010 planned the electricity mix until 2030

Installed capacity and electricity supplied from 2010 to 2030 as planned in the IRP 2010



Source: CSIR

The CSIR used the International Jobs and Economic Development Impacts (I-JEDI) model, a freely available economic tool to understand economic changes (jobs focus at this stage) for energy technology choices, for a range of technologies, including wind, solar, coal and natural gas, after adjusting for South African conditions, in its response to the Department of Energy's invitation for public comment to the IRP 2018 (CSIR, 2018). In its submission to the Department of Energy as part of the IRP 2018 consultation process, the CSIR adopts a scientific methodology in search of an optimal policy choice for South Africa. In its scientific approach, the CSIR provides seven scenarios that offer South Africa the optimal solution in all areas – jobs, technology, water, environment and costs. Table 6.3 shows the seven scenarios that have been analysed by the CSIR (CSIR, 2018). The draft IRP 2018 scenario establishes solid principles:

- Least-cost is confirmed as a combination of PV, wind and flexible capacity as coal decommissions. This combination also exhibits lowest CO₂ emissions and water usage by 2050.

- Technology new-build limits (PV, wind) mean post-2030 deployment is constrained, with new-build coal and gas replacing it (assuming less restrictive CO₂ constraints).
- Higher natural gas (NG) price means less NG usage (notable capacity for system adequacy) and increased new-build coal.
- More strict CO₂ emissions (carbon budget) with renewable energy (RE) new-build limits means less new-build coal and the deployment of nuclear energy instead.
- Higher NG price and more strict CO₂ emissions (carbon budget) with RE new-build limits means less NG and coal, with increased nuclear energy instead.
- A higher or lower demand forecast means the same mix of new-build of PV, wind and the same need for flexibility, just earlier or later.


Table 6.3: The CSIR’s Seven Scenarios

Submitted to DoE on 25 October 2018

A range of scenarios have been assessed as part of the Draft IRP 2018 with key parameter changes

Parameter	IRP1	IRP2	IRP3	IRP4	IRP5	IRP6	IRP7
<i>Demand forecast</i>	Median	Hi	Median	Lower	Median	Median	Median
<i>CO₂ mitigation</i>	PPD	PPD	PPD	PPD	PPD	CB	CB
<i>Annual new-build limit (RE)</i>	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fuel prices</i>	Const.	Const.	Const.	Const.	Market	Const.	Market.
<i>Tx collector station costs</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes


Const. - Constant, Market - Natural gas linked to IEA expected market price
PPD - Peak Plateau Decline, CB - Carbon Budget



our future through science

32

Figure 6.17: Recommended plan by the Department of Energy for new electricity capacity deployment



Source: CSIR

These scenarios were well received by climate change activists, who saw an opportunity to transit into a low carbon economy. Costs and deployment times are seen as a huge advantage for the VRE over coal or gas. However, such enthusiasm ignores the broader South African problem of exclusion based on class, race and access to information and knowledge. It is against this background that I believe that South Africa is ready for a new political settlement. South African courts cannot be the only site of struggle towards a just energy transition. The struggle for inclusion requires broader coalitions, cooperation and teamwork towards a just transition informed by a new political settlement.

A new political settlement for inclusion

A new political settlement for industrialisation in a low-carbon economy must speak to and mobilise key black constituencies, including industrial trades union, through effective skills

upgrading and investment, and productive black entrepreneurs, through opening up economic opportunities. The settlement should speak to their aspirations, especially in urban areas, where the majority now live and where industrial agglomerations are built. It must reach and sustain a shared and binding commitment which, through shared growth and investment, will lead to a reversal of the growing inequality in wealth and access to economic opportunities. The settlement needs agreement around the expectations for large firms, rewarding long-term domestic fixed investment, innovation and dynamic competitive rivalry with effective government policies regarding infrastructure, procurement, skills development, technology and opening regional and international markets. It must be captured in a national agenda, which is designed and delivered locally, where people have a strong sense of identity, and a stake in the outcomes.

Energy infrastructure has, in historical perspective, been at the centre of injustices against the black majority and was an intervention by Afrikaners in a political economy dominated by foreign-owned mining companies (Clark, 1987). In the period between 1985 and 2018, Eskom has experienced various restructuring proposals, including a political transition from a white-dominated government to a black-led government and a focus on extending electricity supply to black areas and thus becoming part of “democracy’s infrastructure” (Von Schnitzler A., 2017). Von Schnitzler (2017, pp.8) uses the term “democracy’s infrastructure,” as a metaphor for the diverse ways in which democracy is grounded in and stabilised by seemingly apolitical technical means and an ethnographic object of investigation – socio-technical assemblages made up of pipes, wires, and meters; the ethical regimes and techno-political calculations through which they operate; and the modes of politics they enable and afford.

Exploring democracy from the perspective of its infrastructures enables the reframing of the conventional story and periodisation of South Africa’s transition. In turn, this infrastructural perspective by Von Schnitzler (2017) opens up conceptual space for a more expansive theory and vision of what it means to act politically in the post-colony and beyond (Mbembe, 2001). Borrowing from the anthropologists, science and technology studies (STS) and ecology, I discuss below what a just transition for Eskom should look like. I define the concept of a just energy transition from the perspective of a restructured Eskom and an IRP 2018 that introduces other forms of electricity, capacity deployment beyond fossil fuels. Just like the struggle against apartheid, I argue that a just energy transition will require a broader alliance of interest groups with a shared vision of the future to act politically (Mbembe, 2001) for a labour-

absorptive sustainable economy away from the MEC of Fine & Rustomjee (1996). Although this is just the beginning of a long walk to a just energy transition, I propose how a new industry could be developed as South Africa takes its long walk to a just transition.

A just transition is about a fair and equitable transformation of the energy sector to a low-carbon economy using a variety of energy mixes, from renewables, through hydrogen, battery storage, waste, and nuclear to thermal energy. However, I am mindful of the challenges of conceptualising justice within climate change, energy and environmental (CEE) scholar communities, since a transition means a different thing to each scholarship. There are three distinct research areas with their own version of “justice scholarship”. These are energy justice, environmental justice and climate justice. How does a society build a development coalition on a “just transition” where there is a shared meaning and outcome?

Von Schnitzler (2017), in a description of a 2004 Diepsloot protest, argues that the “protest challenged not merely a particular policy or a specific local councillor; more fundamentally, it challenged the dominant imaginary of South Africa’s liberal democracy, in which the political domain is clearly delimited, where violence is the prerogative of the state, in which citizens have ‘channels’ of communication, and where a thriving public sphere provides the location for deliberation and debate. A just transition therefore cannot be solely a prerogative of the state, business, unions, professionals and interest groups, but it should accommodate all of us. Perhaps the process that led to the resulted in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) comes close to what a process leading to a just transition should entail.”

However, there are many traps that could impact on a just transition. The sub-Saharan African Region is expected to accelerate to 3,4%GDP growth in 2019, predicated on diminished policy uncertainty and improved investment in large economies together with continued robust growth in non-resource intensive countries. Growth in Nigeria is expected to rise to 2.2% in 2019, assuming that oil production will recover and a slow improvement in private demand will constrain growth in the non-oil industrial sector. Angola is forecast to grow 2.9% in 2019 as the oil sector recovers, as new oil fields come on stream and as reforms bolster the business environment. South Africa is projected to accelerate modestly to a 0.6% pace, amid constraints on domestic demand and limited government spending.

The state coffers are in a worse position with the debt-to-GDP ratio at about 60%, similar to 1990s levels. Unlike in 1994, when the dominant global economic paradigm was pro-markets and governments were advised by the IMF and the World Bank to sell SOEs as discussed in chapter 4, this time it is different. The failure of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and austerity has widened inequality in the world, prompting people to migrate to greener pastures in search of a better life. This then means that in the restructuring of Eskom, President Ramaphosa has space to do the just thing by unbundling Eskom into three entities, generation, transmission and distribution (Ramaphosa, 2019).

Business in transition

Business has reorganised itself and has embraced President Ramaphosa with an enthusiasm reminiscent of the 1990-94 Mandela period. That relationship did not produce favourable outcomes for South Africa as argued by Zalk (2016) and Chabane, Goldstein, & Roberts (2006) that business did not come to the party but internationalised. A 2018 World Bank study based on consumption expenditure data shows that South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world, and that inequality has increased since the end of apartheid in 1994 (World Bank, *An Incomplete Transitions: Overcoming the Legacy of Exclusion in South Africa*, 2018). Analysis of the distribution of consumption expenditure per capita in the recent Living Conditions Survey 2014/15 found that the country had a Gini coefficient of 0,63 in 2015, the highest in the world and an increase since 1994. Further analysis of consumption expenditure trends provides evidence that the consumption expenditure of the very poor – those in the bottom 10% – grew at a slower pace than the consumption expenditure of the rest of the population between 2006 and 2015.

South Africa also lags its peers on the inclusiveness of consumption growth. Inclusiveness, in this case, is examined by comparing the rate of consumption growth for the bottom 40% of the population with that of comparator countries as well as that of sub-Saharan Africa and the world. The result: the bottom 40% had consumption growth of 3,5% between 2006 and 2011, with a deceleration of 1,4% for the period between 2011 and 2015. This does not compare well with the median for the world (3,9%) or, in the later period, with that for sub-Saharan Africa. Most of South Africa's BRICS partners (Brazil, Russia, and China) fare better than South Africa in terms of inclusiveness of growth.

This confirms the unjust nature of the transition from apartheid to democracy. The president's relationship with business has been strengthened by the strengthening relationship between the Presidency and big business. A business team convened by Nick Binedell of the Gordon Institute of Business Studies (GIBS) at the University of Pretoria and Roelf Meyer², a chief negotiator on behalf of the NP in the transition to democracy and Dr van Zyl of Toyota has championed the business-led "Thuma Mina" (send me) campaign (PPGI, 2018). The conveners have formed an umbrella body referred to as the Public-Private Growth Initiative (PPGI) with 19 economic sectors in their fold. The PPGI has developed a short paper on how South Africa can achieve 5% GDP growth. CEOs and chairpersons from 19 sectors of the economy presented their growth plans to the government to increase South Africa's GDP by 5% over the next five years, in partnership with the government. The percentage growth projected in the different sectors varies between 3% and 5%, subject to circumstances relevant to the specific sectors, but the summary projection of achieving 5% contribution to the GDP is also based on the expected multiplier impact on associated businesses that cannot accurately be quantified at this stage (PPGI, 2018). As examples:

- Given a targeted GDP growth of 1% to 3% p/a over five years, increased investment in infrastructure through the construction sector to increase its contribution to 4,9% of GDP (current level of 3,49%) will increase the national infrastructure stock, which, in turn, drives GDP per capita growth. Empirically, this is shown to equate to 1% of GDP per capita growth per infrastructure stock growth in the range of 2,5% to 10%, which range is dependent on factors such the type of and localised need for the infrastructure constructed.
- The ICT sector's potential impact on increased GDP is at best understated. The expressed vision and projections of leaders of this sector should be recognised and supported as an essential pillar to grow the RSA economy to its fullest potential.
- The chemical sector in South Africa contributes about 3% to GDP and 23% to the total manufacturing gross value-add that occurs in South Africa. While the sector is not a massive creator of direct jobs, given that chemical plants are highly automated and capital intensive, it has strong multiplier effects on both employment (of 12 times) and

² Roelf Meyer and President Ramaphosa were key negotiators in the Codesa negotiation and were instrumental in the Constitutional Assembly that led to the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in 1996.

on GDP (5.5 times), as recorded in 2017. Inhibitors related to the sector strategy 2035 must, however, be removed to unlock the full value in this sector.

- Private health contributes 1.28% to the GDP (R55.5bn spend currently) and has a multiplier impact on the GDP of 1.23. The mere 1.28% it contributes to GDP does not reflect the enormous impact it has on the well-being of SA society as a whole.
- The same would apply in the case of the pharmaceutical industry.
- The growth and contribution of particular sectors, such as Agriculture and Tourism, have an exponential impact on the value-added contribution to GDP of other sectors that cannot be quantified accurately at this stage, but should be recognised.

The PPGI proposals get very seductive to a politician seeking to bring hope after twenty-four years of economic mismanagement by the ANC, by promising employment. Private business entities represented in the 19 participating sectors project the employment of a vast number of new people over the next five years. This is based on predicted GDP growth in the country of between 1 and 3% p.a. This can be realised, especially with increased demand for local goods, a stable labour environment and with other relevant inhibiting factors removed. Sectors are committed in their employment plans to meet the minimum employment targets across gender, race and the youth (PPGI, 2018). However, the PPGI highlights constraints and challenges in the investment climate that could undermine the achievement of the ambitious employment rich growth rates. These require a mind-set change on cohesion and coordination between the public and private sector; improved macro investment climate is necessary to attract investments waiting to be made in specific projects; reliable, competitively priced electricity; lack of expert technocrats in critical areas to deal with in the government sector and SOE's.; work permit processes not conducive to importing scarce skills, and the absence of e-visas a barrier to entry and lack of capacity in municipalities and resistance to involving the private sector.

In aggregate, projected investment from a select number of the 19 sectors amounts to in excess of R500bn over the next four to five years if the relevant inhibiting factors are removed and a high-growth path is pursued in the economy (PPGI, 2018). Can business go beyond the promises highlighted above and what is its understanding of a just transition in the energy sector?

Theorising a just transition

In a March 2015 speech at Harvard University, Peter Thiel, an entrepreneur-inventor and innovation investor, argued that humanity needs more technological breakthroughs to deal with enduring global challenges such as climate change, hunger, pandemics and war (Pfothenauer & Juhl, 2017, pp.68). Thiel went on to argue for a state-driven innovation, with grand visions such as going to the moon (Pfothenauer & Juhl, 2017). Not to be outdone, Mazzucato argued for a “mission-oriented state” that takes responsibility for boldly leading the way with a clear and courageous vision and creates the preconditions for innovation by actively shaping markets rather than cheering tamely on the sidelines and intervening only to fix markets when they fail (Mazzucato, 2013). Pfothenauer & Juhl (2017) find both the state-driven innovation with grand vision of Thiel and mission-oriented state of Mazzucato problematic, since there is no consideration of whether the large-scale disruption of socio-economic stability in order to reap a profit in the daring unilateral lonesome style of a Schumpeterian entrepreneur is politically desirable – let alone what it would mean for the state to fail as an entrepreneur (as entrepreneurs frequently do) (Pfothenauer & Juhl, 2017, pp. 70).

The above discussion prompts a number of questions in the just energy transition of South Africa for the Thiel and Mazzucato’s vision-oriented state as well as the PPGI, who have been courting President Ramaphosa, and the Life after Coal and CER activists, who see the courts as arbiters. Why does the absence of a political state matter? The framing of political issues is never self-evident or purely objective, but a political act of inclusion and exclusion has been a fixture in discursive and argumentative policy analysis for several decades (Pfothenauer & Juhl, 2017).

The selective framing of a just energy transition and the technology innovation that it brings towards a low-carbon economy is accompanied by foreign direct investment and facilitation, rather than governance and justice, leading to a considerable bias in the way a just transition is theorised. Pogue (2006) and Jasanoff (2004), on research collaborations and co-production in STS, have emphasised that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it. Consequently, the history of innovation and technological change can be interpreted as one of systematic

exclusion of the political state and the constituency it serves in favour of a purified technocratic understanding of what a just energy transition is, who it is for, and who needs to be involved.

Paradoxically, the energy transition in South Africa is being heralded as a way to disrupt society and change the world for a better life for all, pretending that the disruption has nothing to do with the political and social aspects of the state. It does! Life after Coal and the CER should work with all stakeholders in the Department of Energy process as well as other stakeholders. A victory in court would be hollow in a country rooted in exclusion. A growing economy requires energy and the energy mix should be in the interest of all, not only to reduce environmental degradation, but also to include those that live in poverty, unemployed, in an unequal society.